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1. INTRODUCTION
Mankind's concern with the quality of the environment dates back at least
to 450 BC when Artaxerxes I attempted to restrict cutting Lebanese cedar.I
This concern has recently been expressed by the UNCED conference in Rio de
Janeiro (1992) and the World Bank Report on Development and the Environment
(1992). Both emphasize two points in particular: (i) the presence of "win-win"
situations, indicating that care of the natural environment requires economic
growth, while economic growth in turn cannot take place without taking proper
care of the environment, and (ii) the importance of modeling the environment
as influencing directly the health level and the (economic) well-being of the
individual. It is a challenge to provide a solid economic theory underpinning
these points of view. Naturally, there is a vast literature on the economics
of (non)renewable resources, where the environment is used as an input in the
production function.2 In that literature, however, the environment does nct
directly influence the economic well-being of the individual which therefore
fails to take care of the second point mentioned above.3 Neither is there a
trade-off between a better quality of the environment and a higher rate of
I
For a lucid overview of the roots of environientalism In the western world,
see Grove (1992).
2
See Withagen (1991) for a recent overview.
3
Withagen (1992) takes one of the first steps in this direction, see also
Bovenberg aud Smuilders (1993) and Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1993).
2
economic growth. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991), on the other hand,
investigate what happens to capital intensity and the rate of economic growth
when the environment influences the utility level of the individual. Their
neoclassical model, however, compares different steady states in which extra
care for the environment always harms the level rather than the rate of growth
of production, so they do not find "win-win" situations.
In this paper we take as given point (ii) above, i.e. the benefits from
the environment are reflected in economic well-being, while our main objective
is to investigate under which conditions "win-win" situations can arise.4 In
particular we show, in contrast to Bovenberg and Smulders (1993) and Ligthart
and van der Ploeg (1993), that "win-win" situations can arise even if the
environment does not play a productive role. We depart from neoclassical
growth theory which takes the long-run growth rate as exogenous and use the
insights of the new endogenous growth theory, pioneered by Romer (1986),
instead. We also analyze, within a context of endogenous growth the
interaction between production externalities (productive government spending,
see Barro (1990) and Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990)) and the
environment and derive the optimal tax rule. To this end we extend a popular
model of endogenous growth in which productive government spending is a public
good, developed by Barro (1990), by incorporating the welfare effects of the
A similar question, the double dividend hypothesis, is examined In a static
context by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg
(1992).
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environient, government abatement activities and the negative external effects
of pollution associated with prodnction. Our attention is restricted to
balanced growth paths.5 The task of the government is twofold: on the one hand
it acts as a growth-catalyst by investing in productive government spending
and on the other hand the government must act as caretaker of the environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
briefly discuss the results of Barro's (1990) theory of productive government
spending, distortionary taxation and endogenous growth. In section 3 we drop
productive government spending and focus attention on the environmental
externality. The two basic ways in which pollution affects environmental
quality, namely on the level and the rate of change of environmental quality,
are investigated separately. In section 4 we investigate the interactions of
productive government spending as a public good and the environmental
externality. We analyze both the command optimum and the decentralized market
economy. However, the outcome for the decentralized market economy coincides
with the command optimum if there is only one externality, so that we will
only explicitly distinguish between the command and market outcomes if both
externalities are present. Sections 3 and 4 also provide examples. Section 5
concludes the paper.
There is no need to investigate dynamic convergence to the balanced growth
path, since in all cases the economy will immediately jump to this path.
4
2. Productive government spending, public finance and endogenous growth
To put our results in a proper perbpective we briefly discuss the results
of Barro (1990). The representative consumer maximizes instantaneous utility,
U(c(t)), over an infinite time horizon using the positive and constant time
preference rate (or subjective discount rate) p. The utility function has a
constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (equal to o).6 The
-epresentative consumer, therefore, solves the following problem
OD rc(t) 7-
max f exp(-pt) U(c(t)) dt with U(c(t)) = (1)
0
subject to the consumer budget constraint7
a = r(t)a(t) + w(t)l(t) - -It) (2)
where - r(t) is the interest rate, w(t)l(t) is income from labor, c(t) is
private consumption and a(t) is the stock of non-human wealth, all evaluated
at time t. Consumption is proportional to human plus non-human wealth, because
6
This is the only utility function compatible with balanced growth paths, see
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
7
In the sequel a dot above a variable will denote Its change over time.
Naturally, the no-Ponzi game restriction is also employed.
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there is a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the sequel we
shall abstract from population growth and assume that producers all have
access to the same technology. This allows us to treat the production sector
as if there is only one representative producer. The inputs in production are
labor, private capital gooti, and productive government spending. The
production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type:
y(t) =Ak(t) (1-,6g(t) 16(3)
where 0 < fi < 1, y is output per worker, I is the supply of labor per worker,
k is the representative producer's quantity of capital and g productive
government expenditure per worker. There is no government debt so that the
capital stock is the only asset that is held by the household, hence a = k.
The constant A is a shift parameter incorporating the effect of labor in the
produ':tion function. This can be done because the supply of labor is exogenous
and does not change over time. The productive technology is of the
'endogenous' type as the rate of economic growth can be chosen optimally, and
is not an exogenously determined constant, since there are constant returns to
scale in k and g together (but diminishing returns in k and g separately). We
draw attention to a peculiar aspect of the specification of the production
function, narnely thte power of the government to instantaneously stop all
production in the private sector by setting productive government spending (g)
equal to zero. In reality the government does not have this power and it would
6
be better to specify the model by outiays on productive government spending (a
flow) affecting the level of prod&ctive government spending (a stock). Should
the government cease investment at any moment in time, the production leN A
would slowly fall over time as the btock of productive government spending
depreciates. The specification of the production function in equation (3),
taken from Barro (1990), is therefore a modelling shortcut taken for
convenience, eee also the 'flow' approach to the environment in the sequel. It
is possible to also allow for knowledge spill-overs in production; for
example, by replacing k by kVk(P-') where k denotes the economy wide capital
stock per worker and O<yS1. The smaller the value of y the larger the
productive externality. Such an externality arises when there are no effective
patent markets. In a decentralized market economy the government can correct
for this with the aid of a capital subsidy. In this paper we abstract from
such issues.
The representative producer maxizimizes net wealth takinlg prices and
productive government expenditures as given (R(t) is cumulative interest,:
co
max f exp(-R(t))[(1-rg)y(t) - w(t)l - k]dt (4)
0
subject to the production technology (3), where rg is the (constant) tax rate
on production and k is investment undertaken by the representative producer.
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, there is no depreciation of
7
the capital stock. The government spends its entire income on productive
government spending (g). It finances this spend4ag by levying a distortionary
tax tg on production, so that the budget constraint for the government is;
g = T = rgy = rgAk1 fgt (5)
where T are total taxes paid by the representative producer. Barro derives the
following results:8 (i) the outcome of the decentralized market economy
coincides with the command optimum, (ii) the optimal tax rate equals the
national income share of productive government spending (Tg = p), and (iii)
maximization of the growth rate of the economy (ir, say) is equivalent to
maximization of social welfare. Result (i) requires that there are no
knowledge spill-overs in production (i.e. -y=I). Results (ii) and (iii) depend
on the Cobb-Douglas specification for the production function.
3 Environmental externalities, abatement and endogenous growth
The analysis of section 2 is modifi(- to incorporate utility from
env.ronmental quality, pollution and abatement. To focus attention on the
All conclusions and derivations in this p_.er are conditional on the
boundedness of utility, which basically amounts to assuming that the rate of
time preference is large enough.
8
environment, we abstract here from productive government spending as a public
good in the production function, i.e. ,B = 0, see Rebelo (1991), so:
y(t) = Ak(t) (3')
The environment (the quality of which is denoted by e) enters the
instantaneous utility function U of the households in the follow-ing
non-separable fashion:
f[c% e~ (]1 -17
U(c,e) = j _ [u(c,e)-1]/(I-1/a) o 4 1, O<a<l (6)
I- I/a J
where u(c,e) is defined for convenience and ci represents the importance of
consumption relative to environmental quality in generating instantaneous
utiltity. A deciease in oe is shift of preferences toward a higher
environmental quality. Pollution enters as a by-product of production and
negatively affects the quality of the environment. Both households and firms
are atomistic and do not take into account the damage they impose on the
environment.
The government can positively influence the quality of the environment by
financing expenditures (s) to be spent on abatement policies to clean up the
environment and to be used for direct investment into the environment itself.
A good example is the "San Bei" project in China which started in 1978 and is
expected to last into the second half of the next century. It entails the
9
building of a giant 'Green Wall' in the north of China9 by planting bushes and
trees to halt and reverse the desertification process. Taxes are again levied
on production, so the government budget constraint is
s = T = Tsy = r,Ak (7)
Two basic approaches to model the impact of pollution and abatement on
the environment can be identified in the literature. We will call them the
'flow' approach, see e.g. Forster (1973) and Gruver (1976), and the 'stock'
approach, see e.g. Keeler, Spence and Zeckhauser (1972) and Becker (1982).
The flow approach assumes that the flow of pollution and abatement
affects the level of environmental quality, hence its name. The best example
of such an environmental externality is, perhaps, noise. We get
e = E(y,s) {= E(I,s/y) _ e(r8)}; Ey -c 0, E. > 0 (8)
where we have put in between brackets the assumption that the function E(.) is
homogeneous of degree zero. We will use that assumption throughout the
remainder of the paper for two reasons. First, we cannot investigate balanced
growth paths unless the function E(.) is homogeneous of degree r, which of
course implies ele = y (y/y). Second. if ry is positive (negative)
San Bei stands for the thrce norths, i.e. iiorthwest, north and northeast.
10
environmental quality can only improve if the economy slows down (speeds up).
This implies a rather restricti'e treatment of stock effects, a more general
treatment of which is discussed below. Assuming that r = 0 enables balanced
growth paths of the economy at a stable level of environmental quality (to be
chosen optimally), provided investments in environmental quality and abatement
policies grow at the same rate as the economy.
The stock approach, on the other hand, assumes that the flow of pollution
and abatement indirectly influence the quality of the environment by affecting
the rate of change of the environment over time
e/e = F(y,s) {= F(l,s/y) _ f(r,)}; Fy < 0, F, > 0, e(O) given (9)
A good example of this is acid rain and the associated deterioration of
the ozone layer. To enable balanced growth paths, we have put in between
brackets the assumption, which we will henceforth make, of zero homogeneity of
the function F(.). This does not imply that the environment changes over time
proportional to production, see above. It merely states that the rate of
change of the environment is positively influenced by an increase in the
national income share of investment in the environment and abatement policies
(r,). If f(.) is negative for all values of r,, this implies we can only
influence the speed with which the enviropment deteriorates over time. If
there is a critical value, rT say, such that f(T,) is positive if Tr > T,
then it is possible, aloing a balanced growth path, that the environment
11
imnproves indefinitely. This irnplies, in particular, that there is no upper
bound for the quality of the environment. If e is interpreted in a physical
sense this is obviously not possible since there is a limit to the number of
trees one can plant on the earth. The same problem arises if production is
interpreted in a physical sense in a one-sector neoclassical growth model. One
should, therefore, under these circumstances interpret e as the value of the
environment.10 Otherwise, one would have to look for turnpike theorems. In any
case, these differences of interpretation do not affect the results derived
below.
3.1 Flow of pollution affects environmental quality
As stated in the introduction and will become clear in the next section
the outcome for the decentralized market economy coincides with the command
optimum in the presence of only one externality, as long as the government
sets the income tax rate appropriately. For brevity only the latter will be
discussed here. Under the flow approach to the environment, equation (8), and
in the absence of productive government spending, equation (3'), we can define
the current value Hamiltonian
H1 = U(c,e(rs)) + Aj[Ak-c-sI (10)
Note that we refer to e as the quality of the environment.
12
where Al denotes the social marginal value of capital. The first-order
conditions are:"
cxu(c,e)/c = 1 (11)
(l-oe)[u(c,e)/e](e'/y) = Al (12)
Let a = cx/( 1-a), i.e. a is the importance of consumption Aelative to
environment in the instantaneous utility function, and let e(r8 ) =
Tse'(rs)/e(ra), i.e. e is the elasticity of environmental quality with respect
to abatement, then we derive from equations (11) and (12) the following
relation between the national income share of private consumption c/y - rC and
the share invested in public abatement policies r,:
TC = (/elc)Ts (13)
It follows from equation (13) that an increase in rT increases rc.12 This
necessarily implies that an increase in abatement policies reduces investment
in physical capital, which reduces the growth rate of the economy:
In deriving the first-order conditions, here and in the sequel, one should
keep in mind that terms like rs, depend on s and y, the latter of which in turn
depends on k or on k and 9.
This requires c > r8e /e', which holds if e is concave.
13
Jr = k/k = A(1l-rT-;) (14)
We therefore conclude that "win-win" situations cannot arise if the flow
approach is used, i.e. higher growth is always bad for the environment.
Let, for notational convenience, a = o + (1-oe)a, i.e. a is the weighted
average between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and one, which is
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and the environment in the
instantaneous utility function. Differentiating equation (11) with respect to
time gives
c/c = (a/a)(-Al/Al) + [(a-1)(1-oe)/a](e/e) (15)
from which immediately follows an important observation. The growth rate of
private consumption (which in equilibrium equals the growth rate of the
economy) is independent of the growth rate of the environment if either (i)
the environment does not enter the instantaneous utility function (cc = 1),
(ii) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity, or (iii) the
environment itself does not grow. The latter is the case here so that equation
(15), using A,/Al = pAj - 9I11/9k, reduces to
c/c = (a/a)[A(1-T 8 )-p] (15')
This unaiibig'otisly shows that any increase in rT reduces the growth rate of
14
the economy. Combining equations (14) and (15'), and using that in equilibrium
c/c = k/k, and equation (13) giv-s a relation from which the optimal tax rate
Tr can be solved13
As an example take lim o . 1, i.e. logarithmic utility, and e(Tr) = B-re
for B > 0 and 0 < c < 1, which implies e/e' = r,/e, then equation (16) gives
r, = ep/aA (16')
and therefore the share of income spent on abatement policies increases if the
rate of time preference (p) increases, the importance of environmental quality
in social welfare (1-ce) increases, the effectiveness of abatement activities
(e) increases or productivity (A) decreases and is independent of B. The
effects of 1-oe and c are straightforward. One may wonder why an increase in
the rate of time preference would increase investment in abatement policies.
However, under these circumstances r8 directly affects environmental quality.
An increase in p increases the weight given to this initial consumption of the
environment. Similarly, an increase in A makes investment in physical
production more attractive which (in this case) always implies a decrease in
13
The equilibrium is ulliqile for contcave e(.) if a < 1.
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investment in abatement policies.
In concluding we note that (i) the command optimum coincides with the
outcome for the decentralized market economy, (ii) maximization of the growth
rate is not optimal, and (iii) "win-win" situations are not possible. Point
(i) implies that the first-best oucome can be replicated in a competitive
market economy.
3.2 Stock of pollution affects environmental quality
When there is only one externality we can restrict attention to the
command optimum as this then coincides with the decentral.zed market outcome.
If there is no productive government spending, equation (3'), the current
value Hamiltonian under the stock approach, equation (9), is:
H2 = U(c,e) + A 2[Ak-c-s] + u2 f(T8)e (17)
where A2 and A2 are the social marginal values of capital and environmental
quality, respectively. This gives the first-order conditions:
otu(c,e)/c = A2 (18)
p2f'ely = A2 (19)
Equation (18) is equivalent to equation (11) and states that A2, which is
the shadow price of capital, equals the marginal utility of private
16
consumption. Differentiation again leads to equation (15) which reduces to
c/c = (a/a)[A(1-,r)-p] + [(a-1)(1-c)/a]f(r) (20)
It is now immediately evident from equation (20) that "win-win"
situations are possible under the flow approach if and only if the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (a) is larger than one, since only
then is the growth rate of the economy maximized for a positive level of r,
(provided the limit of f' if rT approaches zero exceeds aA/1(4-1)(1-ot)]). If
it is relatively easy to substitute future consumption of h,oods and the
environment for current consumption (if a > 1), it pays to invest heavily in
physical capital as well as in the environment today in order to enjoy higher
levels of consumption of goods and the environment tomorrow. However, if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high enough and there is no
saturation in the growth of environmental quality growth may be good for
environmental quality.
Differentiating equation (19) with respect to time along a balanced
growth path gives the rather elegant equation
14 It should be noted at this point that estimating the Intertemporal
elasticity of substitution by using the Inverse of the rate of risk aversion
leads to biased estimates In a more general context that allows for
uncertainty, see Selden (1978) and van der Ploeg (1992).
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A2/A2 + k/k = P2/P2 + ele (21)
Hence, the capital gains of ir-estment in capital plus its growth rate
must be balanced against the capital gains of investment in the environment
plus its growth rate. Using A2/A2 = PA2 - 8H2 /1k and I 2 /P2 = PP2 - H212/9e
equation (21) reduces to
f'(rT) = oaA (21')
which determines the optimal tax rate r,. Most importantly, this tax rate is
independent of the rate of time preference and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. This is intuitively appealing in view of the symmetric treatment
of production and the environment both in the instantaneous utility function
and in the investment functions under the stock approach. The optimal tax rate
and national income share of abatement increases if productivity (A) decreases
(see 3.1) or if the importance of environmental quality (1-oc) increases.
In concluding we note that (i) the command optimum coincides with the
decentralized market outcome, and can thus be replicated in a market economy,
(ii) maximization of the growth rate is not optimal,' 5 and (iii) given that
there is no saturation of environmental quality, "win-win" situations are
possible if and only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds
This is because maximizalioui of 7r in equation (20) does not lead to equation
(21').
18
unity.
4. Productive government spending and the environment
Finally, we evaluate the interactions between the productive government
spending externality discussed in section 2 and the environmental externality
analyzed in section 3. Throughout this section, therefore, the production
function corresponds to (3), while instantaneous utility is given by (6). In
the presence of two externalities the government must simultaneously act as
caretaker of the environment and as growth catalyst. Its budget constraint is
given by
(Trg+T)Y = T (22)
where g= g/y and r, = sly.
4.1 Productive government spending and the flow of pollution
4.1.1 The decentralized market economy
Under the flow approach the level of environmental quality is given by
(8). The outcome of the household's maximization of utility and the producer's
net wealth optimizatioll then leads to the following differential equations
(where use has been made of the fact that e does not change over time along a
19
balanced growth path)
C/C = (a/a)[(l-f)(1-rg-rT)[Ar9] -Pp] {= 7} (23)
k/k = (l-Tg--TsTc) [44] (24)
Given the government choice of tax rates Tg and r8, the growth rate of
the economy 7r is determined by equation (23). Equation (24) then determines
the concomitant share of consumption r,. Given k(O) this determines c(O) and
hence the welfare level, W say, associated with rT and r8:16
tC(O)O`e 1-a) (1-1/ef)
W = ,with e = e(7r8 ) (25)
(1-1/o)[p - oe(1-1/o)7r]
c(O) = k(O)[(1-rT-gT)[A gfJ -T 7r];
Where ir follows from (23). The objective for the benevolent government is
to maximize W given the initial capital stock, k(O), and the changes of c and
k over time by using the instruments Tg and rT. Maximizing welfare with
respect to T9 leads to the condition that Oir/Org = 0, which gives the
following optimal taxation rule: I
We drop the constant -I/(1-1/)p in W.
17 Maximization of the growth rate of the decentralized market economy,
20
rg = ,8(1-Tr) (26)
The optimal share of productive government spending in national income
(Tg) is smaller than its marginal productivity ,B because of the detrimental
effects of production on the environment and crowding out when there is
positive investment in abatement activities, i.e. when T8 > 0. Hence, a higher
share of abatement activities, which reduces pollution and improves the
environment, is accompanied by a lower share of investment in growth-promoting
productive government spending, such that the total tax rate rises less than
proportionally. Maximization of W with respect to r8, using the optimal
taxation rule rg = #( 1-7-,), shows that 497r/0T, s 1 0 due to the term e in the
numerator of W. The growth rate of the economy is therefore maximized with
respect to rg, but not with respect to r,.
4.1.2 The command optimum
When we allow for productive government spending and the externality
arising from the flow of pollution the current value Hamiltonian is
H3 = U(c,e(r,)) + A3[AkI43g#-c-s-g] (27)
equation (23), also leads to the optimal tax rule (26). In particular, under
the flow approach this growth rate Is maximized if r, - 0, and hence r= j.
21
with first-order conditions
au(c,e)/c = A3 (28)
[(1-oa)u(c,e)/eI/3T.e' = A 3 (y-g) (29)
[(l-a)u(c,e)/e](e'/y) = A3 (30)
Equation (28) is by now familiar. Equation (29) immediately shows that
putting Tg = 3 cannot be optimal, while combining equations (29) and (30)
gives the same optimal tax rule as for the decentralized market economy in the
presence of both externalities, see equation (26).
Tg9 = #(1Tn) (31)
Similarly, combining equations (28) and (30) leads to the same relation
between the share of consumption and investment in abatement in the absence of
the productive government spending externality, see equation (13).
r- (cx/c)78 (32)
Hence, the optimal tax rule is rcbust with respect to the decentralized
market outcome and command optimum, and with respect to the presence of
productive government spending (since rg = 0 if f = 0), while the relation
22
between consumptioni and investment in abatement under the flow approach is
robust to allowing for productive government spending
Differentiating equation (2'8) with respect to time and using A3 = pA 3 -
aH3/ak and the first order conditions, we get the following differential
equations for the command economy.
c/c = (a/a)[(1-p)(1-T9)FAr-l'p-p] (33)
k/k = (3-r4-)r-Tc4[AJ1(
If we compare the evolution of the mark.: economy and the command economy
we note that the technical relations are the same, equations (24) aind (34),
but the optimal consumption relations differ. In particular, we immediately
note the absence of the term Tg in equation (33) if compared to equation (23).
This implies, for given values of rg and r,, that the market economy grows
more slowly, due to crowding out, than the command economy. Maximization of
the same welfare function under different conditions leads to different
outcomes, so the private optimum does not coincide with the command optimum.
It is also clear that in the presence of only one externality, implying either
T9 = 0 or rT = 0, equations (23) and (33) coincide, so the private and command
optimum are identical.
Combining equations (33) and (34), while using equations t31) and (32),
leads to an equation from which the optimal tax rate r, (and hence r9 ) can be
solved (this equation reduces to equation (16) if fi = 0):
23
1 1
(po/a) -( c(a- l )/y)(1l-)[Ap#(1-r 8 )I = (°/) (35)
4.1.3 An example
To illustrate some of the aspects of the interaction between productive
government spending and the environment we assume that the elasticity of
environmental quality with respect to abatement is constant, i.e.
e(Tr) = BrT with B > O, O < e < 1 (8')
With this specification a typical plot of the welfare level of the market
economy as a function of the share of income used for abatement (using the
optimal tax rule) is unimodal, provided the welfare level is bounded, see
footnote 8. In the sequel the optimal outcomes for the command economy and the
decentralized market economy will be identified using subindex c (for command)
and m (for market) respectively. Let r,* denote the value of rT, the share of
income used for abatement policies, that maximizes the growth rate of the
decentralized market economy (equation 23) after substitution of the optimal
tax rule (equation 26), see footnote 18. Our representative base scenario has
parameter values: ar = 2; o = .7; # = .15; e = .3; p = 1; A = 2; and B = 1,
which leads to:
rs*=O < T, 6=O9 < .074=r 8 1 a
= .1 0- .139 =
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c(O),= .858 < 1.152 = C(°)m
7r= .405 > .104 = 1rm
Wc= 1.959 > 1.940 = Wm
Hence, we find that the optimal share of income used for abatement in the
decentralized market economy is higher than in the command economy and
therefore the concomittant share of income used for productive government
spending is lower in the market economy than in the command economy.18 This
somewhat unexpected result follows from the fact that for a given choice of
government tax rates the decentralized market economy grows more slowly than
the command economy, due to crowding out, which makes it easier, and hence
more attractive, to clean up the environment in a market economy. In that
sense crowding out is beneficial to the environment and, from a purely
environmental point of view, the decentralized market economy can be preferred
to the market economy. Since the command economy grows more quickly than the
market economy, which requires higher investments in physical capital, the
initial consumption level is lower in the command economy than in the market
economy. Since "win-win" situations cannot occur under the flow approach the
share of income used for abatement policies that maximizes the growth rate of
the decentralized market economy is zero. Obviously, the welfare level in the
18
That is, we were unable to come up with a counterexample to this
observat iont.
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command economy (the first best solution) exceeds the welfare level of the
decentralized market economy (the optimal second best solutioin).
The influence of the parameters on some of the optimal variables is
listed in table 1. The qualitative responses for the market economy and the
command optimum are identical. Less environmental concern (higher a) or a
smaller effectiveness of abatement policies (lower E) boosts the share of
growth promoting government spend-ng and depresses the share of abatement
policies. As a result the rate of economic growth is higher while
environmental quality deteriorates and the initial level of private
consumption falls (see section 3.1). In fact, a more patient society (lower
p), easier intertemporal substitution (higher o) or a higher level of physical
productivity (higher A) induce the same effects (also see section 3.1).
A larger role for productive government spending (higher Oi) boosts both
the share of growth-promoting public spending and the share of abatement
policies. The severity of the externality associated with productive
government spending increases and therefore requires an increase in the share
of income used to fight this externality. This increase in the tax rate
reduces the growth rate of the economy which in turn makes it easier to clean
up the environment through an increase in abatement policies.
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List of symbols
a non - human wealth
A physical productivity parameter
B environmental productivity parameter
c consumption
c command
e environmental quality
e(.) er-ironmental flow function
E(.) environmental flow function
f(.) environmental stock function
F(.) environmental stock function
g productive government spending
H Hamiltonian
k stock of private capital
I labor
m market
r interest rate
s government spending on abatement
R interest factor
t time
T total tax
U(.) instantaneous utility
u(.) monotone transformation of instantaneous utility
w wage rate
W welfare level
y production
at relative importance of consumption in instantaneous utility
Cc = ce/(l-oc)
,8 productivity of productive government spending
e elasticity of environmental quality with respect to abatement
A shadow price of capital
p shadow price of the environment
p rate of time preference
a intertemporal elasticity of substitution
a weighted average of 1 and a
'r. = glY
rg = s/y
r8* rate of rT that maximizes the market economy growth rate
= c/y
7r growth rate of the economy
over a variable denotes rate of change over time
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Table 1 Growth and the Rate of Pollution (e = Br6)
Changes in Environmental concern (basecase: o=.7)
Command Solution Market Solution
oc=.65 o=.7 oc=.75 oa=.65 ca=.7 oc=.75
TSc .090 .069 .051 rTm .096 .074 .056
rgc .136 .140 .142 rgm .136 .139 .142
c(0), .889 .858 .825 c(O)m 1.165 1.152 1.137
7r, .340 .405 .467 Irm .056 .104 .148
WC 1.908 1.959 2.018 Wm 1.893 1.940 1.994
Changes in the role of productive government spending (basecase: 3=.15)
Command Solution Market Solution
,6=.1 , =./15 ,=.2 ,B=.1 6=..15 ,B=.2
r,C .061 .069 .076 Tgm .063 .074 .083
Tgc .094 .140 .185 Tgm .094 .139 .183
c(°)c .782 .858 .917 C(O)m 1.000 1.152 1.275
7r, .622 .405 .236 .rm *400 .104 -.133
W, 2.068 1.959 1.883 Wm 2.054 1.940 1.860
Changes in effectiveness of abatement (basecase: e = .30)
Command Solution Market Solution
c=.20 e=.30 e=.40 e=.20 e=.30 e=.40
rac .045 .069 .095 TSM .048 .074 .101
rgc .143 .140 .136 Tgm .143 .139 .135
c(0)C .837 .858 .880 C(O)m 1.139 1.152 1.165
irc .465 .405 .342 .TM 158 .104 .047
WC 2.045 1.959 1.887 IV, 2.023 1.940 1.870
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Changes in the rate of time preference (basecase: p =1)
Command Solution Market Solution
p=.9 p=1 p=1.1 p=.9 p=1 p=1.1
'rac .056 .069 .083 rsm .061 .074 .087
Tgc .142 .140 .138 Tgm .141 .139 .137
c(0), .693 .858 1.024 c(O)m .992 1.152 1.312
lrc .592 .405 .218 Zm .285 .104 -.078
WC .007* 1.959 -. 057* Wm -. 025* 1.940 -. 070*
Changes in the level of productivity (basecase: A = 2)
Command Solution Market Solution
A=1.5 A=2 A=2.3 A=1.5 A=2 A=2.3
,r,gc .124 .069 .049 Tam .128 .074 .054
7Tc .131 .140 .143 Tgm .131 .139 .142
C(°)c 1.087 .858 .716 c(O)m 1.282 1.152 1.071
^rc -. 248 .405 .812 7rm -.448 .104 .447
WY 1.725 1.959 2.170 Wm 1.719 1.940 2.129
Change in intertemporal substitution (basecase: or = 2)
Command Solution Market Solution
a=1.5 a=2 or=3 a=1.5 o=2 ar=3
TSC .074 .069 .061 Tam .078 .074 .068
79c .139 .140 .141 Tgm .138 .139 .140
C(0)c .922 .858 .758 C(O)m 1.169 1.152 1.124
irc .333 .405 .519 lrm .081 .104 .141
WC -. 048* 1.959 -. 030* Wm -. 063* 1.940 -. 057*
Base scenario: a = 2; oc = .7; j3 = .15; e = .3; p = 1; A = 2; B = I
* The welfare changes of a and p also take into consideration changes in the
constant -I/(l-l/e)p, which for the base scenario results in WC = -.041 and Wm
= -.060. An increase in B does not affect rgm, rsc, rgm rgc, C(O)m, C(0)c, Wm
or irc, but positively influences both the quality of the environment and the
welfare level.
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To conclude we note that (i) the command optimum does not coincide with
the private optimum, i.e. the first-best outcome cannot be sustained in a
decentralized market economy, (ii) maximization of the growth rate is not
optimal, (iii) "win-win" situations are not possible, and (iv) the optimal tax
rule is rg = P( 1-ir.) in both private and command optimum. Clearly, we are in
the realms of second-best problems of public finance.
4.2 Productive government spending and the stock of pollution
4.2.1 The decentralized market economy
Under the stock approach the level of the environment is given by (9).
The outcome of the household's maximization of utility and the producer's net
wealth optimization then leads to the following differential equation for
private consumption. 19
1
C/c = (AgG)[(1-f,)(1-P9 -T8 )[Ar$ 1-pj + [(u-1)(1-c)/c]f(r-) (36)
Given the government choice of national income share of productive
government spending and abatement (,r and Ts), the growth rate of the economy
7r is determined by equation (36). Equation (24) then determines the
19 Maximization of the growth rate of the decentralized market economy under
the stock approach also leads to optimal tax rule (31).
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concomitant national income share of private consumption (rT). Given k(O) this
determines c(O) and hence the welfare level W associated with rg and r8 . It
can be shown, see Verbeek (1993), that maximization of W by the benevo:ent
government implies that ir is maximized with respect to r9, but not with
respect to r8 , and again leads to the optimal taxation rule -g ( = -r ), see
equations (26) and (31). It is also apparent from equation (36), even taking
into account the optimal taxation rule, that the growth rate of the economy is
maximized for positive levels of investment in abatement, and hence "win-win"
situations occur, if and only if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
exceeds unity.
4.2.2. The command optimum.
Under the stock approach and with productive government spending as a
public good the current value Hamiltonian is
114 = U(c,e) + A4 [Ak1-gf3-c-s-g] + P4f(r8)e (37)
with first-order conditions
au(c,e)/c = (38)
'rs/j4ef= A4(#Y-g) (39)
pef/y = A4 (40)
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Equation (38) is familiar, while cquation (40) coincides with equation
(19), which shows that the relation between production and the shadow prices
of the environment and capital does not depend on allowing for productive
government spending. Differentiation of this relation with respect to time
along a balanced growth path then obviously results again in equation (20) on
the necessity to balance the capital gains of investment in capital plus its
growth rate against the capital gains of investment in the environment plus
its growth rate. Combining equations (39) and (40) once more leads to the
optimal tax rule rg = #(1-r,). Using this optimal tax rule, A4/A4 = PA14
OH4/ck and P4/p4 = pp4 - (9H4 /3e equation (20) leads to
f'(Tr,) = A' ( 1-r)f 1- (41)
which reduces to equation (21') if /1 = 0. As in section 3.2 the optimal tax
rates ; and r, are independent of the rate of time preference and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The discussion on the divergence
between the decentralized market economy and the command optimum is analogous
to section 4.1.2 above.
4.2.3 An example
Finally, we illustrate the above analysis by assuming that the elasticity
of the growtht rate of cinvironmenital quality with respect to abatement is
constant, i.e.
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ele = Br-- with B > 0, 0 < e< 1 (9')
The base scenario, using parameter values o = 2; ae = .7; ,B = .1; e = .3;
p = 1; A = 1.6; B = 1, leads to:
7rs* = 009 < Tc = .0 37 < .038 = Tsm
Tg0 = .096 > .096 = rgm
c(0),= .846 < 1.019 = c(0)m
7r,= .281 > .107 = 1rm
WC 2.230 > 2.221 = Wm
As in the example discussed in section 4.1.3 the share of income used for
abatement (productive government spending) is higher (lower) in the
decentralized market economy than in the command economy. This confirms the
results in the static model of Bovenberg and de Mooij (1993) who find that an
increase of environmental taxes toward their Pigovian level, which fully
internalizes the social costs of pollution, may no longer be welfare improving
if the government requires distortionary taxes to finance its spending, see
also Oates and Schwab (1988). Again, as under the flow approach, the growth
rate of the market economy is lower and hence the initial consumption level is
higher. In contrast to the flow approach, the share of income used for
abatement policies that maximizes the growth rate of the economy is positive
(since in our example o > 1). Jlence up to that point the interests of the
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economy and the environmentalists coincide. The influence of the parameters on
some of the optimal values is listed in table 2. The qualitative responses of
the share of income used for abatement activities are identical for the
decentralized market economy and the command economy, with the exception of
changes in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (a) and the rate of
time preference (p) on the tax rates r8 and rT. As explained above the command
optima TSc and rgc are independent of the levels of p and a. In contrast,
changes in these parameters lead to, in general rather miniscule, changes in
the optimalmarket economy tax rates rem and rT.m The qualitative responses of
the share of income used for abatement polici3s that maximizes the growth rate
of the economy and the share of income used for abatement policies that
maximizes the welfare level of the decentralized market economy are identical.
The qualitative impact of most parameters on the economic variables under
the stock approach coincides with their impact under the flow approach, so we
restrict attention here to the points where they diverge. Most obviously, a
stronger growth in environmental quality (higher B) now does affect rT,, r,c,
Tgm, rgc, C(O)m, c(O)c, 7rm or irc, and again positively influences the growth
rate of environmental quality and the welfare level. A shift of preferences to
environmental quality (an increase in 1-ox) increases the share of income used
for abatement and reduces the growth rate of the economy both under the stock
approach and the flow approach. Under the stock approach, however, investment
in the environment is similar to investment in physical capital and therefore
requires a decrease in the initial consumption level. The effectiveness of
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Table 2 Growth and the Stock of Pollution (ele = BTe)
Changes in Environmental concern (basecase: a=.7)
Command Solution Market Solution
oe=.65 cx=.7 oi=.75 ce=.65 oc=.7 o=.75
,r,* ..012 .009 .007** r,* .012 .009 .007**
TJaC .051 .037 .026 T sm .052 .039 .026
'9C .095 .096 .097 rgm .095 .096 .097
C(O)C .842 .846 .849** C(O)m 1.006 1.019 1.031**
7rc .267 .281 .293 .rm 101 .107 .109
WC 2.247 2.230 2.216** Wm 2.239 2.221 2.206**
Changes in the role of productive government spending (basecase: #=.15)
Command Solution Market Solution
8=.15 #=.2 6=.1 fl=.15 ,=.2
TS* .008 .009 .011** r* .008 .009 .011**
,rC .033 .037 .039 r., .033 .039 .041
Tgc .048 .096 .144 T9g .048 .096 .144
C(°)c .764 .846 .908 C(O)m .863 1.019 1.140
irc .521 .281 .100 11m .422 .107 -.134
WC 2.383 2.230 2.129 Wm 2.379 2.221 2.117
Changes in effectiveness of abatement (basecase: e = .30)
Command Solution Market Solution
e=.20 e=.30 c=.40 e=.20 e=.30 e=.40
7s* .009 .009 .009** 78* .009 .009 .009**
TS8C .033 .037 .034** 'rm .034 .039 .035**
,r,c .097 .096 .097** r9m .097 .096 .096**
c(0)C .812 .846 .870 C(O)m .986 1.019 1.044
7rc .319 .281 .260 Zm .144 .107 .085
WC 2.289 2.230 2.189 Wm 2.279 2.221 2.181
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Changes in the rate of time preference (basecase: p =1)
Command Solution Market Solution
p=.9 p=l p=1.1 p=.9 p=1 p=1.1
Tga* .009 .009 .009** ra* .009 .009 .009**
t8c .037 .037 .037** 'rm .038 .039 .037**
T9c .096 .096 .096** rgm .096 .096 .096**
C(O)C .692 .846 1.000 C(O)m .865 1.019 1.173
7rc .435 .281 .127 7rm .260 .107 -. 047
WC .318* 2.230 -. 182* Wm .303* 2.221 .176*
Changes in the level of productivity (basecase: A = 2)
Command Solution Market Solution
A=1.5 A=2 A=1.7 A=1.5 A=2 A=1.7
,r,* .011 .009 .009 78* .011 .009 .009
,ra, .041 .037 .033 r., .042 .039 .034
Tgc .096 .096 .097 Tgm .096 .096 .097
-(°)C .888 .846 .804 C(O)m 1.048 1.019 .990
lrc .156 .281 .406 7rm -. 005 .107 .219
WC 2.161 2.230 2.305 Wm 2.154 2.221 2.294
Change in intertemporal substitution (basecase: a = 2)
Command Solution Market Solution
a=1.5 a=2 a=3 a=1.5 a=2 a=3
,r,,* .005 .009 .014** Ts* .005 .009 .014**
Irc .037 .037 .037** Trm .037 .039 .038**
Tgc .096 .096 .096** rgm .096 .096 .096**
C(0)C .913 .846 .750 C(0)m 1.060 1.019 .961**
irc .214 .281 .377 7Tm .066 .107 .165
WC .217* 2.230 .249* Wm .210* 2.221 .236*
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Change in Growth of Environmental Quality (basecase: B = 1)
Command Solution Market Solution
B=.8 B=1 B=1.2 B=.8 B=1 B=1.2
.007 .009 .012** .007 .009 .012**
TSC .023 .037 .048 'rm .027 .039 .049
Tgc .097 .096 .095 rgm .097 .096 .095
C(0)c .862 .846 .828 c(0)m 1.038 1.019 .999
7rc .278 .281 .284 7rm .102 .107 .112
Wc 2.202 2.230 2.261 Wm 2.193 2.221 2.251
Base scenario: e = 2; a - .7; ft = .15; e .3; p = l; A = 2; B 1
* The welfare changes of e and p also take Into consideration changes In the
constant -1/(1-1/e)p, which for the base scenario results in W, = .230 and Wm
= .221.
** These results are different from the flow approach and note that r. is
always equal to zero in the flow approach.
abatement activities (e) on the optimal tax rates is ambiguous because if it
is easier to clean up the environment it is also more attractive not to do so
since, other things being equal, an increase in e increases the marginal
utility of consumption, which therefore makes it more attractive to consume.
To summarize: (i) the command optimum does not coincide with the outcome
of the decentralized market economy, and it is thus not possible to sustain
the first-best optimum in a market economy, (ii) maximization of the growth
rate is niot optimal,20 (iii) "win-win" situations are possible if and only if
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds unity, and (iv) the
optimal tax rule is T9 = /3( 1-Tr) in both the decentralized market economy and
20
On this see Verbeek (1993).
37
the command optimum.
5. Conclusions
Recentiy, the importance of environmental and economic "win-win"
situations has been stressed, indicating that care of the environment requires
economic growth, while economic growth in turn cannot take place without
taking proper care of the environment. We generalize a popular endogenous
growth model with constant returns to scale in a broad measure of the capital
stock, by making consumers care not only about current and future consumption
levels, but also about the current and future quali'y of the environment, to
see under what circumstances "win-win" situations can arise. The capital stock
is decomposed into private capital and productive government spending.
Production of goods and services causes pollution which is detrimental to the
environment. The government can invest in abatement processes to clean up the
environment and in productive government spending by taxing production (=
income). There is, therefore, both an environmental externality and a public
good, i.e. productive government spending. This brings us within the realms of
second-best economics. We investigate the decentralized market economy as well
as the command economy. Two approaches to model the environment can be
distinguished in the literature: the stock approach and the flow approach. The
flow approach assumes that the level of environmental quality changes
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instantaneously if the production level changes or if the level of abatement
changes and is particularly relevant for analysing the environmental
externality associated with noise. The stock approach, on the other hand,
assumes that pollution and abatement indirectly influence the environment by
affecting the rate of change of the environment over time and is more relevant
for analyzing the problems of acid rain. Some of the conclusions we derive
are:
"Win-win" situations cannot arise under the flow approach, but can arise
under the stock approach if and only if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution exceeds unity. This holds even though the natural environment
does not play a productive role.
Maximization of the growth rate of the economy is never optimal, unless
consumers do not care at all about the environment.
The command economy can be sustained in a decentralized market economy if
and only if there is either an environmental externality or productive
government spencing as a public good, indicating that one tax instrument can
be used for one task only. Otherwise, for given tax rates, the market economy
grows more slowly than the command economy due to crowding out.
It is always optimal to set the share of income used for productive
government srending equal to the productivity of government spending after
correction for the share of income spent on abatement policies. This optimal
tax rule, therefore, reflects the fact that investment in productive
government spending must be smaller than its marginal product (the positive
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externality) to correct for the negative externality of pollutioln associated
with production. Maximization of the growth rate of the decentralized market
economy is characterized by the same optimal tax rule.
The growth rate of the economy is independent of the change over time of
the environment if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is unity -
i.e. if the utility function is loglinear over time.
Under the stock approach the optimal tax rates of the command optimum do
not depend on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the rate of
time preference.
In our two examples we found that under eitF er the stock or flow approach
the share of income used for abatement is higher, and therefore the natural
environment is cleaner, in the optimal decentralized market economy than in
the command economy. This follows from the distortionary taxes needed to
finance government spending which, through crowding out, leads to a lower
growth rate of the market economy. This, in turn, makes it easier, and hence
more attractive, to clean up the environment in a decentralized market
economy. This is of course due to the interaction between the two distortions.
The distortionary taxation with the purpose of financing public investment
lowers the growth rate more in a decentralized market economy and hence lowers
the opportunity cost of abatement. This is generally true when a market
failure affects the dyniamics of the economy.21 Also, less environmental
Some types of externalities, however, can have opposite affects. See Aghion
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concern, a smaller effectiveness of abatement policies and a higher level of
productivity depress the national income share of abatement policies and boost
the share of growth-promoting public spending, hence the rate of economic
growth rises while environmental quality worsens in 'spendent of whether the
rate of pollution affects the level or the rate of change of environmental
quality. A higher effectiveness of productive government spending raises,
however, both the national income share of productive government spending and
of abatement policies and improves environmental quality while depressing the
rate of economic growth.
and Howitt (1992), where innovation can cause higher growth, as the innovators
do not take into account the premature obsolence of existing products. Here a
market failure raises growth but would harm the the environment. We thank Bill
Easterly for this observation.
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